Coyne on Free Will in USA Today

[acornuser]

Thought this might be of interest:

www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/story/2012-01-01/free-will-science-religion/52317624/1

[fortigurn]

From what I can see, there are three interesting consequences of this conclusion.

* Contrary to recent modern claims, Newton was right after all; the universe is clockwork despite quantum mechanics

* Contrary to recent modern claims, the future is indeed forseeable, given sufficient calculating power

* Even if free will is only an illusion, society must function as if free will actually exists

[Mike D]

So Coyne is saying we should choose to abandon our illusions of freewill, eh?

[technomage]

So should I believe this article, or not?



I can't decide!

[technomage]

Jan 4, 2012 9:25:45 GMT fortigurn said:

* Contrary to recent modern claims, Newton was right after all; the universe is clockwork despite quantum mechanics

* Contrary to recent modern claims, the future is indeed forseeable, given sufficient calculating power

Eh ... when it comes to quantum mechanics, the only thing I'm certain about is that I'm certain I don't understand it. That being said, I was under the impression that Newtonian physics still works perfectly fine for most scales and conditions. It is only when you get down to quantum scale or up to relativistic conditions that Newtonian mechanics breaks down.

One part that I do NOT understand--do the changes in brain chemistry fall within quantum scale?

* Even if free will is only an illusion, society must function as if free will actually exists

If the illusion presented to the Brain in a Jar is sufficiently convincing...?

[unkleE]

Jan 4, 2012 11:02:17 GMT Mike D said:

So Coyne is saying we should choose to abandon our illusions of freewill, eh?

I think he could respond in two ways. (1) He has no choice in his expectations and actions, and so is bound to act as if the illusion of free will was real, even in his response here, and (2) his urging us to think in a certain way is part of the input that our brain will react to, so may nevertheless help cause a change in our thinking.

But I found many things in this article very interesting.

1. The assumption, never argued, that the physical is all there is. This is reinforced by the corollary assumption that science is the best and only way to discover reality, and therefore that neuroscience explains everything about "us". If questioned, he would say that science has the track record, what other means of knowing is as reliable, etc. But this is a circular argument, and that assumption requires us to disregard everything we experience about ourselves, our thinking and choices and being.

All this on the basis of an assumption. Make a different assumption (e.g. that our experience of self is more complete than the neuroscientific conclusions), and you end up with quite a different story. I think our experience of self is trying to tell us something that Coyne's assumptions won't allow him to hear. He doesn't even seem to be aware that he's made an assumption and that there could even possibly be an alternative.

Truly, these scientists need the rigour of philosophical thought at the very time when they are distancing themselves from it!

2. He cannot resist having a go at evangelical christians, and doesn't seem to realise how silly his comments are. If he is right and there is no God and the physical is all there is, evangelical christianity is wrong from start to finish (i.e. it is a poor description of reality), and the extra information he claims to have about lack of freewill is largely irrelevant. And if he is wrong about God, and the physical is not all there is, then his arguments about the conclusions of neuroscience are also wrong. It all comes back to his unstated assumptions again.

3. All this raises again the argument from reason made famous by CS Lewis, Alvin Plantinga and Victor Reppert. We know our minds are capable of thinking accurately and logically (except if we are low IQ, ill, tired or drunk), but if our thinking is determined by brain chemistry, what makes it "correct"? Evolution works by naturally selecting those characteristics that enable genes to be passed on, not by what is true, so how did our brains get to be so logical?

The naturalist answer has to be that survival depends (among other things) on correct reasoning, but it is a big step from the simple logic of "If lion, then run" to consistently doing advanced logic, science, mathematics or metaphysics without choice. Nevertheless, the naturalist can say that is what has happened, but this seems to require our minds to get it right on all subjects to a high degree, as we don't have any choice about it, it is simply the way our brains work.

But we are told our brains are hard-wired for religion and we know about 80% of people in the world believe in God, one conclusion of the determined human brain that the naturalist cannot allow. So somehow the naturalist has to hold that our determined choice-less brains consistently get some things right yet consistently get this one wrong!

4. Further, if free will is an illusion, he has to hold that an illusion somehow aids natural selection. But an illusion is an untruth, and the naturalist reply to #3 is that our brains arrive at truth. So there is a disconnect here.

In the end, I can't see the Coyne view prevailing. He admits we need the illusion of free will, logic says he has made an unprovable assumption that leads him in a circle, and most people (other than ultra 'scientifists') will probably prefer to trust their experience of life rather than the naturalist's unproven assumptions.

I think, in the hands of a far cleverer thinker than I am (Plantinga anyone?), this free will discussion could well become a strong argument for the truth of God and the disproof of naturalism as a metaphysical assumption.

[technomage]

OK, please take this post as more "musing out loud" than "disagreeing with you."

Jan 5, 2012 1:17:35 GMT unkleE said:

The assumption, never argued, that the physical is all there is.

I presume you're familiar with the difference between methodological naturalism (lets call this MN to same me from typing as much) and metaphysical naturalism (MetaN) . Was he actually speaking of "the physical is all there is" (metaphysical), or was he limiting himself to "The physical is all I can talk about and stay within the realms of science"?

OK, re-reading the article--to my mind, it sure looked like he was speaking of metaphysical, and he makes a far more definite statement than I choose to make. But if you take his views as an expression of methodological naturalism, I can see his views as being reasonable enough.

Usually, I would tend to agree that MN specifically, and science in general, has absolutely nothing to say about metaphysical topics: science is not competent to discuss them. I'm fairly certain most or all here will agree. There are, however, certain metaphysical-related claims that, IMO, science is capable of addressing. I'm not certain of the popularity or acceptability of this particular topic, so please pardon me if I cause offense.

Science has absolutely no competence to examine the phrase "God created the heavens and the earth." Science is exquisitely competent to examine the phrase "God created the heavens and the earth less than 10,000 years ago." The first claim is a pure metaphysical claim, the second has elements of both metaphysics and physics. Science still cannot examine the metaphysical components of the second claim, but it can most certainly examine the physical components. (I'll drop the discussion there.)

With that understanding (coming back to the subject of the article), yes, the author was most likely implicitly denying dualism, and assuming (as you note) "the physical is all there is." I also see your counterassumption: "our experience of self is more complete than the neuroscientific conclusions."

Uncle, is your assumption strictly metaphysical, or does it combine both metaphysics and physics? If your assumption is solely metaphysical, then I'd say this research cannot competently address your assumption. If there are physical elements, then ... well, this is not a "slam dunk" refutation of dualism, but it certainly seems to fulfill the criteria of necessity and sufficiency.

We know our minds are capable of thinking accurately and logically (except if we are low IQ, ill, tired or drunk), but if our thinking is determined by brain chemistry, what makes it "correct"?

There is a problem here: logic is a tremendously effective guide to consistency. It is NOT a terribly effective guide to truth, unless you can be certain that all of your presuppositions are true

In science (actually, in epistemology in general), I am of the opinion that we cannot know with absolute certainty that our thinking is "correct." We can know that our findings on any particular question is consistent enough within the limits of our instrumentation and senses to say "We nailed that one," but absolute certainty is beyond us. There is always a possibility of misapprehension, of misunderstanding, or of outright error, so we can never speak of absolute certainty.

Further, if free will is an illusion, he has to hold that an illusion somehow aids natural selection. But an illusion is an untruth, and the naturalist reply to #3 is that our brains arrive at truth.

Natural selection works on one standard: utility. If truth is useful, it is more likely to be selected. If illusion is useful, it is more likely to be selected.

I think, in the hands of a far cleverer thinker than I am (Plantinga anyone?), this free will discussion could well become a strong argument for the truth of God and the disproof of naturalism as a metaphysical assumption.

I have to admit, I am ... less than inpressed by Plantinga. More on that later, if desired.

[endrefodstad]

unkleE, would you mind explaining the exact nature of Coyne's circular argument (in your section "1"). It have a bit of a problem clearly seeing it.

[Mike D]

I get an uncomfortable feeling that, if you assume that the neuroscience model is a sufficient description of the human mind, you end up with a model of illusion built upon illusion.

If the neuroscience model is the complete description, then the sense of self is an illusion. More than that, it is an illusion produced by the brain to fool itself (!).

If you add in freewill on top of that, you get that freewill is an illusion produced by the brain to fool the sense of self (which is itself an illusion, also produced by the brain) into thinking that it really makes decisions.

All of which leaves me wondering if this is really the best explanation of the human mind...

[unkleE]

Jan 5, 2012 9:09:10 GMT endrefodstad said:

unkleE, would you mind explaining the exact nature of Coyne's circular argument (in your section "1"). It have a bit of a problem clearly seeing it.

Coyne makes this statement:

"The debate about free will, long the purview of philosophers alone, has been given new life by scientists, especially neuroscientists studying how the brain works. And what they're finding supports the idea that free will is a complete illusion."

I do not read this in isolation, but having previously read other articles by him,and I have some idea about his thinking. He speaks very definitely. He bases his views on the findings of neuroscientists, and he says very definitely that we have no free will. I assume he is familiar with the concept of dualism, but he makes no mention of it even as a possibility.

The only way his views on science can be a logical position is if we accept something like the following argument:

1. Science addresses only the physical world of measurable and experience-able phenomena.
2. Science has a wonderful track record of finding truths about the world.
3. Therefore science is the most efficient way to learn truth about the physical world.
4. Science doesn't provide any evidence of a non-physical reality.
5. Therefore the physical is all there is.

Clearly #4 is implied by #1, so the argument is circular.

Re freewill, we could show the same circularity in the logic about freewill. His implicit argument might go like this:

1. The neuroscientists can find no place for freewill.
2. Science only deals with the physical world.
3. If dualism was true, freewill could exist and the scientists would not have found it.
4. Some forms of dualism posit something beyond the physical.
5. Therefore dualism cannot be proved or disproved by science.
6. I assume dualism is false.
7. Therefore the findings of the neuroscientists are valid.
8. Therefore there is no freewill.

He has to make the assumption #6 to get anywhere.

That was what I was thinking.

[unkleE]

technomage,

I understand the distinction between MN and MetaN, but I can't see how that helps here. If he assumes MN, he can only say that science cannot find a source of freewill, which is a long way from his actual statement "you don't really have free will".

I also see your counterassumption: "our experience of self is more complete than the neuroscientific conclusions."

I say this simply because he and others present their case as if the science proved it all, when in fact they have made an assumption and so have I.

Uncle, is your assumption strictly metaphysical, or does it combine both metaphysics and physics?

I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand the question. The way I look at it is this. I accept the science. But I still feel like I have free will. There are two possibilities:

1. The science explains it all, there is no non-physical, no God, etc, and no freewill. I just am under the illusion I have freewill, and that is just the way it is.
2. The science doesn't explain it all, there is a non-physical, there is a God and I do have freewill. The science only sees part of the picture, and it sees that part accurately, but the parts of the picture it can't see are the source of my genuine freewill.

Both views respect the science, both make assumptions, and neither can really be proven. But on other grounds, I believe I have strong reasons to believe in God, so I will naturally choose the second option, just as he, as an atheist, will choose the first. It is an impasse, but he will try to pass off his view as scientific and mine as an illusion - when in reality both are scientific and it isn't clear which one is an illusion.

In science (actually, in epistemology in general), I am of the opinion that we cannot know with absolute certainty that our thinking is "correct."

Yes, of course. But within practical assumptions about reality (e.g. we could all be brains in vats, but no-one really thinks we are), we can "know" things by repeated testing of our thinking - e.g. get a different person to re-do the logic or the mathematical proof or the scientific experiment. And it turns out that our brains are remarkably consistent - 1 + 1 is always calculated as 2, etc. That is a fact that needs to be explained, and the argument is that, if natural selection was the only factor in the evolution of our brains, this consistency is harder to explain.

I don't pretend this whole thing is clear, but I think his assumptions need to be recognised. So my rant arose from that. Thanks for your comments.

[Deleted]

Why don't you all stop reading articles from amateurs about topics they clearly don't understand and start studying academic discussions about free will?

[technomage]

Jan 5, 2012 13:36:21 GMT @matko said:

Why don't you all stop reading articles from amateurs about topics they clearly don't understand and start studying academic discussions about free will?

Because then--as I am an amateur writing about a topic I don't understand--nobody will read my posts.

[technomage]

Jan 5, 2012 11:51:32 GMT unkleE said:

I understand the distinction between MN and MetaN, but I can't see how that helps here.

It probably would have helped if my discussion above had been more clear, but clarity is ... difficult on this subject. At least it is for me. It's likely that there is a clear and coherent way to express my thoughts, and I'm just having problems expressing it.

One of my reasons for the degree of epistemological skepticism that I have is that I don't trust the concepts of "justified belief" or "basic belief." We have no objective standard for either of these criteria systems, thus we are not dealing solely with logic or knowledge: we are also dealing with our own subjective prejudices and preferences.

Now, like you, I do tend towards dualism, though I make a distinction between knowledge and belief, and for me dualism falls firmly outside of the "knowledge" category.

So here we have neurological findings that gives information on the process of making a decision. Coyne sees the article and says "Hey, this refutes Cartesian dualism." You see Coyne's article and note some serious problems with Coyne's arguments. Both of you feel that your conclusions are justified.

Heck, maybe you're both wrong, and we're back to the brain-in-a-vat, or Dexcartes' evil demon.

Uncle, is your assumption strictly metaphysical, or does it combine both metaphysics and physics?

I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand the question.

I'm sorry, I guess I didn't express that too clearly.

Let us examine two possibilities:
1. There is no non-physical component to mind.
2. There is a non-physical component to mind.

Obviously of these two statements, at most only one can be true. (They may both be false, but I don't understand how that would work.) Is there necessarily any purely physical differences between the two--differences that the science can determine?

We actually have no way to know, in part because science is incompetent to discuss metaphysics, and in part because we cannot compare the two cases--we can only speculate. It's like looking at Dawkin's God Hypothesis: Dawkins asserts that if God exists, the world would have certain specific traits. How precisely does he know what traits would exist in a world where God exists? He doesn't--he speculates. At great length. (Indeed, I don't think "bloviates" is too strong a term--I'm not terribly impressed with Dawkins either, and for much the same reason as my disappointment with Plantinga.)

1. The science explains it all, there is no non-physical, no God, etc, and no freewill.

I think we can both agree that the above statement is beyond the purview of science.

2. The science doesn't explain it all, there is a non-physical, there is a God and I do have freewill.

Here's where we may disagree--so is that one.

Both views respect the science

Actually, neither view--when expressed as you have above--does. They both add to what science is competent to discuss. Well, technically, they "respect" the science in that they don't make science say something it's not saying, but both statements add conclusions that cannot be reached by science.

But within practical assumptions about reality (e.g. we could all be brains in vats, but no-one really thinks we are), we can "know" things by repeated testing of our thinking - e.g. get a different person to re-do the logic or the mathematical proof or the scientific experiment. And it turns out that our brains are remarkably consistent - 1 + 1 is always calculated as 2, etc. That is a fact that needs to be explained, and the argument is that, if natural selection was the only factor in the evolution of our brains, this consistency is harder to explain.

A couple of things here.

1. 1 + 1 = 2: Yeah, it's a trivial example to illustrate a point about consistency. To my mind, it's the wrong example, because it depends entirely on human definitions. Mathematics does not exist outside of a mind to define it: the universe does not do sums.
2. For non-trivial examples, yes, the human mind can be pretty consistent on gathering data and analyzing it--that's not a given, but if we take sufficient care, we've got a decent batting average. We are, however, incredibly variable in the conclusions we reach based on that data.

Oy! At this point my brain is hurting! I haven't had a cup of coffee yet this morning, so if any of the above is unclear, I plead insufficient caffeination!

[unkleE]

Jan 5, 2012 13:36:21 GMT @matko said:

Why don't you all stop reading articles from amateurs about topics they clearly don't understand and start studying academic discussions about free will?

It happens to have been raised. I have read some more expert writings, though my capacity to understand is probably limited. Do you have a suggestion?