www.jesusmythbusters.com

[Deleted]

There is this book written by John Earman, a contemporary philosopher of science, "Hume's Abject Failure", which, in my view, demolishes Hume's argument against miracles through Bayesian reasoning. And not only that. Hume was unoriginal in his treatment and had a dim view of natural laws.

[perplexedseeker]

If anyone is interested, the entire book can be read online here: www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780195127386/toc.html

[Deleted]

It requires a username and password.

[peterdamian]

Apr 21, 2010 13:44:24 GMT @matko said:

There is this book written by John Earman, a contemporary philosopher of science, "Hume's Abject Failure", which, in my view, demolishes Hume's argument against miracles through Bayesian reasoning. And not only that. Hume was unoriginal in his treatment and had a dim view of natural laws.

I haven't read the book (Hume's Abject Failure). Which of the many points raised by Hume does Earman demolish?

The principle that in the case of a report of some improbable event we should always have regard to the possible inaccuracy or deception, and that the improbability of the reported event is a prima facie case for investigating the reliability of the report seems unassailable to me.

I use this principle in daily life. If someone reports something unexceptional to me ('the post has arrived') I hardly question it. If by contrast someone phones or emails with some claim about a high-performing investment fund, I typically throw it in the waste bin, or at least do a very thorough background check.

Perhaps I am wrong.

[perplexedseeker]

If anyone is interested, the entire book can be read online here: www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780195127386/toc.html

Sadly, I have little to no experience in Bayesian reasoning, so I am ill-placed to evaluate the effectiveness of Earman's attack. He seems to be suggesting that unless you accept testimonial evidence, it becomes impossible to override your own basic assumptions. For example, a hypothetical Indian who has never experienced subzero temperatures could be rationally justified in ignoring eyewitness accounts of ice in other countries, since it is contrary to all his experience. After all, these stories always come from places very far away!

But perhaps I misread the author. Matko?

[Deleted]

Apr 21, 2010 14:08:41 GMT peterdamian said:

I haven't read the book (Hume's Abject Failure)Which of the many points raised by Hume does Earman demolish?

A majority of them. He doesn't hide his distaste for Hume.

[peterdamian]

Apr 21, 2010 14:10:25 GMT @matko said:

Apr 21, 2010 14:08:41 GMT peterdamian said:

I haven't read the book (Hume's Abject Failure)Which of the many points raised by Hume does Earman demolish?

A majority of them. He doesn't hide his distaste for Hume.

I shall be sceptical about your report of the book until I have read it!

[edit]
There is a summary of Earman's case here. www.davidhume.org/documents/2003%20Hume%20Miracles%20Probabilities%20slides.pdf

Earman argues that Hume's proposition which I have quoted here "That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish" is trivial and tautological.

I don't think it's trivial at all. A vast number of people have argued for the truth of miraculous events based on sources whose falsity, when examined carefully, is far more probable than their truth.

Also, given that people here (such as James Hannam, apparently) are claiming that we should not have regard to the intrinsic plausibility or possibility of what is claimed by a historical source, it is not clear to me that it is trivial at all. If Hume's principle were trivial, surely they would have realised there was a problem.

[syzygy]

Quote: "I don't understand the meaning of 'natural'. And I don't say 'mostly', I say we should always prefer the more probable explanation, over the less probable. Forget 'natural.'"

I think this is an important statement. I would cast the argument as between one who "forgets 'natural'" and one who, as a believer in the supernatural, can't do that because it's the supernatural's necessary counterpart. I would say that the terms "probable" and "improbable" have a certain logical priority over "natural" and "supernatural" simply because it's on the basis of the former pair that we structure all our beliefs. I also think that some of our beliefs are about the latter pair (including whether they have any real referent), and to leave them out of the debate makes for a rather sterile procedure, a debate to nowhere. One ought to say what one's best guess is: Are there 2 levels of reality or only one? To do that you have to break out of the methodological restriction to "probable" and "improbable" events.

Quote: "[D]on't expect that people who require convinving evidence of the supernatural to be convinced by reports of the miraculous."

I don't. I also think UncleE makes a strong point about the movement in the opposite direction. Once convinced about the supernatural, it's much easier to be convinced by reports of at least some miracles, not just that something highly improbable has happened but that two levels of reality intermingled.

[peterdamian]

Apr 21, 2010 14:32:55 GMT syzygy said:

Quote: "I don't understand the meaning of 'natural'. And I don't say 'mostly', I say we should always prefer the more probable explanation, over the less probable. Forget 'natural.'"

I think this is an important statement. I would cast the argument as between one who "forgets 'natural'" and one who, as a believer in the supernatural, can't do that because it's the supernatural's necessary counterpart. I would say that the terms "probable" and "improbable" have a certain logical priority over "natural" and "supernatural" simply because it's on the basis of the former pair that we structure all our beliefs. I also think that some of our beliefs are about the latter pair (including whether they have any real referent), and to leave them out of the debate makes for a rather sterile procedure, a debate to nowhere. One ought to say what one's best guess is: Are there 2 levels of reality or only one? To do that you have to break out of the methodological restriction to "probable" and "improbable" events.

Quote: "[D]on't expect that people who require convinving evidence of the supernatural to be convinced by reports of the miraculous."

I don't. I also think UncleE makes a strong point about the movement in the opposite direction. Once convinced about the supernatural, it's much easier to be convinced by reports of at least some miracles, not just that something highly improbable has happened but that two levels of reality intermingled.

I think I agree with this. The proponents of philosophical 'naturalism' have created a real hostage to fortune. First, it's rather hard to define 'natural'. Some believers in the 'supernatural' think that such events are perfectly 'natural' but can't be explained by science in its current state. The usual example is of showing some primitive tribe a television or an aircraft. They would think this was supernatural, we know it is perfectly natural.

Better to think in terms of 'background assumptions' which we all share as human beings in the current state of knowledge. Apologists for the miraculous tend to share these background assumptions. E.g. here

livetracts.com/resurrection.html

The point is made that " A one-and-a-half to two-ton stone was rolled into a slightly depressed groove to seal the tomb’s entrance." i.e. use is made of the assumption that an ordinary human being could not possibly shift such a heavy stone. Why not?

It goes on "Perhaps one of the women sweet-talked (karate-chopped?) the guards while the others moved the stone and tiptoed off with the body. Or maybe Peter (remember his bravery) or Thomas (Doubting Thomas) overpowered the guards, stole the body, then fabricated—and died for—a resurrection myth. These theories hardly seem plausible. The guard was too powerful, the stone too heavy and the disciples too spineless to attempt such a feat."

Use of many background assumptions like the improbability of cowardly people turning brave, of weak people overcoming strong people. And so on.

[perplexedseeker]

Personally, I quite like Spinoza's approach to miracles, which is briefly summarised at the link below. He contends that to a perfect understanding (I suspect that by this he means God, though in Spinoza's case it may be entirely hypothetical), nothing would be miraculous in the sense of breaking the laws of nature, and that calling something a miracle simply refers to our own lack of knowledge about how it happened. If an event appears to break the laws of nature, it is much more likely that our understanding of that event is incomplete than that it truly breaks them.

maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/11/spinozas-epistemic-theory-of-miracles.html#more

Unfortunately I have yet to get hold of a full version of Spinoza's Treatise, so I have not yet fully examined his arguments...

[peterdamian]

Apr 21, 2010 15:02:56 GMT perplexedseeker said:

Personally, I quite like Spinoza's approach to miracles, which is briefly summarised at the link below. He contends that to a perfect understanding (I suspect that by this he means God, though in Spinoza's case it may be entirely hypothetical), nothing would be miraculous in the sense of breaking the laws of nature, and that calling something a miracle simply refers to our own lack of knowledge about how it happened. If an event appears to break the laws of nature, it is much more likely that our understanding of that event is incomplete than that it truly breaks them.

maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/11/spinozas-epistemic-theory-of-miracles.html#more

Unfortunately I have yet to get hold of a full version of Spinoza's Treatise, so I have not yet fully examined his arguments...

I know Bill (Maverick Philosopher) very well. It was his 'epistemic theory of miracles' that I had in mind above. I recommend his blog for any of those here who do not already know of it.

[edit] Note there is a version of the Tractatus available online on Google books. See chapter 6, On miracles.

books.google.co.uk/books?id=gl42XSjdF6wC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

[perplexedseeker]

Thankyou. I look forward to reading it.

[James Hannam]

Apr 21, 2010 14:18:44 GMT peterdamian said:

Also, given that people here (such as James Hannam, apparently) are claiming that we should not have regard to the intrinsic plausibility or possibility of what is claimed by a historical source, it is not clear to me that it is trivial at all.

Of course I didn't say this. What I said is that a dogmatic statement, with Hume, that a miracle claim can never be accepted is unjustifiable. I also said that history cannot make a judgement about whether a miracle really happened, only what people at the time believed.

I hope that is clearer.

Best wishes

James

[peterdamian]

Apr 21, 2010 15:47:20 GMT James Hannam said:

Apr 21, 2010 14:18:44 GMT peterdamian said:

Also, given that people here (such as James Hannam, apparently) are claiming that we should not have regard to the intrinsic plausibility or possibility of what is claimed by a historical source, it is not clear to me that it is trivial at all.

Of course I didn't say this. What I said is that a dogmatic statement, with Hume, that a miracle claim can never be accepted is unjustifiable. I also said that history cannot make a judgement about whether a miracle really happened, only what people at the time believed.

I hope that is clearer.

Best wishes

James

That is clearer, and apologies.

[Deleted]

Apr 21, 2010 15:02:56 GMT perplexedseeker said:

Personally, I quite like Spinoza's approach to miracles, which is briefly summarised at the link below. He contends that to a perfect understanding (I suspect that by this he means God, though in Spinoza's case it may be entirely hypothetical), nothing would be miraculous in the sense of breaking the laws of nature, and that calling something a miracle simply refers to our own lack of knowledge about how it happened. If an event appears to break the laws of nature, it is much more likely that our understanding of that event is incomplete than that it truly breaks them.

maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/11/spinozas-epistemic-theory-of-miracles.html#more

Unfortunately I have yet to get hold of a full version of Spinoza's Treatise, so I have not yet fully examined his arguments...

The relevant portion is printed in Earman's books (He addresses the Indian prince, too, Seeker), and I advise everyone to read it directly and not rely on someone else's summaries, especially if it's by a Hume idolater.