Quantum phenomena and omniscience

[perplexedseeker]

I have recently heard the interesting argument that the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics disproves the omniscience of God, under the assumption that if wave functions collapse due to being consciously observed, then if God were omniscient then His existence would cause the simultaneous collapse of all wave functions in the universe. Thus, since we can observe this phenomenon ourselves (so the argument goes), God cannot be omniscient.

There has been a lot of discussion of physics here, so I was wondering if anyone has a response to this. I suspect that the scientist making this point has misunderstood the nature of omniscience, though I could be wrong.

[knowingthomas]

If that's the case, how come John Polkinghorne believes in the Copenhagen Interpretation?

www.starcourse.org/jcp/qanda.html

It’s worth raising a couple of warning flags here: although the observations from measurements are probabilistic the Dirac Equation, which governs how the wavefunctions evolve over time, is deterministic. This is one of the factors that leads to the notorious “measurement problem” of QM to which there is no agreed philosophical or scientific answer (Roger Penrose for example has a conjecture that it involves gravity). John and I (and most working scientists) favour the “Copenhagen Interpretation” which essentially accepts that, in some undefined way, a “measurement” is a fundamental operation which forces the wavefunction to choose which state it falls into.

[unkleE]

Nov 25, 2009 0:23:46 GMT perplexedseeker said:

I have recently heard the interesting argument that the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics disproves the omniscience of God, under the assumption that if wave functions collapse due to being consciously observed, then if God were omniscient then His existence would cause the simultaneous collapse of all wave functions in the universe.

So, when it suits them, they will argue that a God who exists outside of the space time universe cannot intervene in it because that would break the laws of physics, but also when it suits them, they argue that he can intervene enough to collapse wave functions? Which one is correct?

I think arguments like that are the 21st century equivalent of arguing about angels dancing on heads of pins, but maybe I am just missing the point.

[Mike D]

I'm not a physicist, and quantum mechanics has always had the feeling of being a bit suspect - nevertheless, I accept it on the basis that those who know more about the subject than me say that it is in all probability true.

That's my preamble, as a kind of disclaimer on what I say hereafter.

So - my understanding of the Copenhagen Interpretation is that the wavefunction and the probabilities attached thereto represent uncertainty in knowledge and not a physical attribute of the observed system. Moreover, I understood that under the Copenhagen Interpretation, it is possible (for more than one observer) to have more than one wavefunction.

If this is correct (and I would stress my disclaimer here! - what I know of the Copenhagen Interpretation is what I have read in popular summaries) then surely the whole argument against God from un-collapsed wavefunctions itself collapses?

Mike

[perplexedseeker]

Another bizarre pairing of arguments that I've often heard is that free will is impossible since the universe (at a macroscopic scale) is causally closed and entirely deterministic. And they then turn around and say that humans are the outcome of "a process of pure chance". I truly do not understand this. If determinism were true, then there could be no such thing as "chance" or "randomness". Humans were inevitable from the moment the universe began, as there is only one possible future.

Surely these arguments contradict each other? Or have I completely misunderstood the concept of determinism? Quite aside from the fact that any reasoning would also be highly suspect, since it was already inevitable that you would come to those conclusions (and became so as soon as the universe came into being).

[unkleE]

Nov 26, 2009 20:19:48 GMT perplexedseeker said:

Another bizarre pairing of arguments that I've often heard is that free will is impossible since the universe (at a macroscopic scale) is causally closed and entirely deterministic. And they then turn around and say that humans are the outcome of "a process of pure chance". I truly do not understand this. If determinism were true, then there could be no such thing as "chance" or "randomness". Humans were inevitable from the moment the universe began, as there is only one possible future.

Surely these arguments contradict each other? Or have I completely misunderstood the concept of determinism? Quite aside from the fact that any reasoning would also be highly suspect, since it was already inevitable that you would come to those conclusions (and became so as soon as the universe came into being).

1. Of course the statement that "the universe (at a macroscopic scale) is causally closed and entirely deterministic" is an assumption and not at all provable.

2. When I have discussed such questions, some people say that determinism is true and "randomness" is more or less a synonym for "unpredictable by us humans", whereas others say that quantum randomness is genuine randomness and the basis of a non-deterministic universe. Who can say?

[Al Moritz]

Nov 26, 2009 20:19:48 GMT perplexedseeker said:

Another bizarre pairing of arguments that I've often heard is that free will is impossible since the universe (at a macroscopic scale) is causally closed and entirely deterministic. And they then turn around and say that humans are the outcome of "a process of pure chance". I truly do not understand this. If determinism were true, then there could be no such thing as "chance" or "randomness". Humans were inevitable from the moment the universe began, as there is only one possible future.

Surely these arguments contradict each other? Or have I completely misunderstood the concept of determinism? Quite aside from the fact that any reasoning would also be highly suspect, since it was already inevitable that you would come to those conclusions (and became so as soon as the universe came into being).

On a macroscopic scale the universe may be deterministic, but on the quantum level it is not. For example, mutations of DNA as quantum events are indeterministic, 'random' or 'by chance', so then humans would be the product of chance indeed, were it not that evolution works by natural selection. However, to some extent the environment that does the natural selection is also the product of chance, even though certainly evolution is following certain general paths that probably will be walked no matter what; yet the details may vary if you replay the whole thing.

In a sense humans thus are the product of 'chance', in another sense the emergence of intelligent beings is probably not, because of the convergent paths of evolution -- while those intelligent beings might not necessarily have turned out as humans with their specific bodily features.

As far as free will goes, quantum effects may allow for interaction of a 'soul' with the brain. The quantum effects are indeterministic, 'random', but the free will can steer them one way or another, converting randomness into directionality. In this way the will may deliberately act on matter, and free will, not determined by mere matter interactions, may indeed be possible.

[himself]

As I understand it, there are three major stories of quantum mechanics:

• 1. Copenhagen
  
• 2. Many-worlds
  
• 3. Transactional
  

All three are stories that are true to the facts as they are known. Cramer reported an experiment that supposedly produced facts explicable by his transactional story, but not by the other other two; but devotees of orthodoxy and of many-worlds replied that this was not so. As far as I know it's still up in the air.
+ + +

Chance is not a cause of anything. Chance is the intersection of two unrelated causal lines. Those mutations occurred for a reason. A nucleotide was altered. Perhaps by ionizing radiation. Perhaps by a chemical. Perhaps by a transcription error of some sort. The fact that we cannot predict what will happen and when does not mean the event is not caused. We don't know which apple will fall from the tree and when: but apples detach from the parent tree for known physiological/botanical reasons, and they fall according to the laws of gravity.

It would be a mistake, I think, to expect to predict everything with the rigor of mechanics or electromagnetism. Even mechanical motion becomes indeterminate if you demand tighter precision or a longer-term forecast. Ivar Eklund once wrote that to correctly predict a 7-ball cannon in a game of billiards, one would have to take into account the gravitational attraction of the bodies of the spectators. The solar system only looks like "clockwork" in the short term and with loose precision.

[Al Moritz]

Nov 27, 2009 1:24:04 GMT himself said:

Chance is not a cause of anything. Chance is the intersection of two unrelated causal lines. Those mutations occurred for a reason. A nucleotide was altered. Perhaps by ionizing radiation. Perhaps by a chemical. Perhaps by a transcription error of some sort. The fact that we cannot predict what will happen and when does not mean the event is not caused.

Correct. Something can be indeterminate but it is caused nonetheless. Take radioactive decay, for example. The cause is the instability of the nucleus, but nobody can predict which nucleus will decay when (though when it comes to a large agglomerate of nuclei, one can statistcally determine a precise half-life).

We don't know which apple will fall from the tree and when: but apples detach from the parent tree for known physiological/botanical reasons, and they fall according to the laws of gravity.

However, it is important to make a distinction here: the forces that determine which apple will fall from the tree and when are not necessarily subject to quantum effects, unlike the just mentioned radioactive decay.

It would be a mistake, I think, to expect to predict everything with the rigor of mechanics or electromagnetism. Even mechanical motion becomes indeterminate if you demand tighter precision or a longer-term forecast. Ivar Eklund once wrote that to correctly predict a 7-ball cannon in a game of billiards, one would have to take into account the gravitational attraction of the bodies of the spectators. The solar system only looks like "clockwork" in the short term and with loose precision.

Again be careful: that something is unpredictable because it falls under chaos theory, like the weather or your billiard example, does not necessarily mean that it is not determined. It is a mistake to confuse quantum indeterminism with chaos 'indeterminism'. The latter may still be subject to deterministic forces, though just like indeterministic quantum effects they are unpredictable.

[perplexedseeker]

I think I'm still a little confused. If I take an intermediate example, say, a test tube of water with protein molecules dissolved in it, all of the molecules within the water are moving by random Brownian motion. If, in principle, you knew the exact position of every water molecule at one instant in time, and had a supercomputer that was powerful enough to model all these particles according to the laws of physics, would you be able to infallibly predict exactly where each protein molecule would be in, say, two hour's time?

Or would the intdeterminacy of the position of all the electrons in the water mess this up?

To tackle the question another way, presumably free will does not mean acting acausally, but rather that you have genuine intentional choice between multiple options in responding to a cause, and that the one you choose could not be predicted mathematically?

[Al Moritz]

Nov 27, 2009 13:29:28 GMT perplexedseeker said:

I think I'm still a little confused. If I take an intermediate example, say, a test tube of water with protein molecules dissolved in it, all of the molecules within the water are moving by random Brownian motion. If, in principle, you knew the exact position of every water molecule at one instant in time, and had a supercomputer that was powerful enough to model all these particles according to the laws of physics, would you be able to infallibly predict exactly where each protein molecule would be in, say, two hour's time?

Or would the intdeterminacy of the position of all the electrons in the water mess this up?

Yes, indeterministic quantum effects would not allow for a prediction of the exact positions of each protein molecule in two hours time.

To tackle the question another way, presumably free will does not mean acting acausally, but rather that you have genuine intentional choice between multiple options in responding to a cause, and that the one you choose could not be predicted mathematically?

I would think this is correct.

Al

[himself]

Free choice does not mean unpredictable.
Free choice does not mean random.
Free choice does not mean unreasonable.
Free choice does not mean improbable.
Free choice does not mean successful exection.
Free choice does not mean no unpleasant or undesired consequences.

Free choice only means that the will chooses among the options as known by the intellect. It is the "intellective appetite," by which one may "hunger" for justice, power, peer approval, etc.; just as the sensitive appetites may hunger for food, drink, sex, etc. "Your money or your life" is a free choice, even if most people would reasonably choose to give up their money.

[bjorn]

Free choice means free choice. Free. Choice.

[perplexedseeker]

Thanks for the clarification. I've just been reading an awesome introduction to moral philosophy ("Wickedness", by Midgely) that I think puts it really well:

"Determinism can simply be taken to mean "predictability". This is certainly the sense in which it is used in the sciences, since predictability based on orderly laws is what allows hypotheses to be tested and theories built. We need to assume a certain amount of determinism whenever we deal with other humans (that they will feel pain when we hurt them, and so on). This has no relevance to questions of free will, since an action can still be free even if it is predictable. For example, a farmer whose field is flooded by a river each year can observe the patterns of flooding and build a dam to protect his field. A clever observer could predict he would do this, as any rational human would, but that did not mean that the farmer's course of action was not freely chosen. He could have despaired and taken no action instead. Believing that we have no choice in our actions, and that the laws of nature compel us to do things is not determinism, but rather a form of superstitious fatalism."

[ignorantianescia]

This is a very interesting topic. From my understanding (and I am very much a newbie) of quantum mechanics, quantum entanglement between the physical observer and the observed is essential for collapse of the wave function. So I think this argument against God would require God to be a physical observer or the argument indeed collapses. Most people here would not see God as a physical being, though. If God is not a physical being, there is no quantum entanglement. And thus the argument collapses.